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Vanishing Exception to the
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: The
Child Abuse Reporting Act
Children have been physically injured, neglected, and molested by
their guardians throughout history.' The problem of child abuse,2
however, has been acknowledged only recently.3 Contrary to popular
belief, child abuse is not limited to a particular class or sect.' Abuse
is not correlated with race, income level, or social background. 5 The
problem pervades the entire economic and social spectrum of our
6
society.
To protect abused children, those children first must be located.7
Legislatures in all fifty states have enacted provisions designed to identify and protect abused children.' These laws often require specified
1. Brown, Fox & Hubbard, Medical and Legal Aspects of the Batterd Child Syndrome,
50 CHI-KENT L. REv. 45, 53 (1974); Fraser, A Glance at the Past, a Gaze at the Present,
a Glimpse at the Future: A Critical Analysis of the Development of Child Abuse Reporting
Statutes, 54 Cm-KENT L. REV. 641, 641 (1978); Brown & Truitt, Civil Liability in Child Abuse
Cases, 54 Cm-KENT L. REv. 753, 753 (1978); Harper, The Physician, the Battered Child, and
the Law, 31 PEDIATRICS, 899, 900 (1963) (early recognition of child abuse).
2.
Child abuse and neglect generally has been defined as the physical or mental injury,
sexual abuse or exploitation, negligent treatment or maltreatment of a child by a person responsible for the child's welfare. See REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, INCREASED
FEDERAL EFFORTS NEEDED TO BarER IDENTIFY, TREAT, AND PREVENT CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT,
by the Comptroller General, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE I (April 29, 1980).
3. Smith, Berkman, & Fraser, A PreliminaryNational Assessment of Child Abuse and
Neglect and The Juvenile Justice System: The Shadows of Distress, in REPORTS OF THE NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSICE AssEsSmNT CENTERS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 2 (April 1980); Fraser,
supra note 1, at 641. See Comment, Reporting Child Abuse: When Moral Obligations Fail,
15 PAC.L.J., 189, 189 (1983).
4. Comment, The CaliforniaLegislative Approach to Problems of Willful Child Abuse,
54 CALIF. L. REv. 1805, 1806 (1966). See generally Gil, The Incidence of Child Abuse &
Demographic Characteristicsof Persons Involved, in THE BATTERED CHILD, 19-39 (1968).
5. Comment, supra note 4, at 1806; Steele & Pollack, A Psychiatric Study of Parents
Who Abuse Children and Small Infants, in THE BATTERED CHILD, 89, 92- 94 (1974).
6. See Gil, supra note 4, at 19-39; Steele and Pollack, supra note 5, at 92.
7. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 13; Brown & Truitt, supra note 1 at 760;
Fraser, supra note 1, at 645.
8. Comment, supra note 3, at 189; Fraser, A PragmaticAlternative to Current Legislative
Approaches to Child Abuse, 12 Am. CRi. L. REv. 103, 104 (1974); se6 J. COSTA & G. NELSON,
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT; LEGISLATION, REPORTING, AND PREVENTION (1978) (an explanation
of these laws); see also P. DECoURCY, A SILENT TRAGEDY, CHILD ABUSE IN THE Co~imMITY,
at 10-11 (1973). These legislative efforts came in response to strong public interest raised by
a 1962 article that coined the term "battered child syndrome." Kempe, Silverman, Steele,
Droegenmueller, & Silver, The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962).
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individuals to report suspected abuse to child welfare agencies. 9 Persons required by the statutes to report suspected abuse typically are
professionals likely to come in contact with children.' 0
Psychotherapists" often are among those persons who have a duty
to report.'" Psychotherapists required, or desiring, to report abuse
are always in a difficult position because their profession relies on
confidentiality for successful treatment.' 3 To ensure confidentiality,
communications between patients and psychotherapists generally are
granted a privileged status in the law." The delicate balance between
the interests in favor of reporting child abuse, and the privacy interests of psychiatric patients will be explored in this comment.
To accomplish this examination, this comment will begin by
recognizing the general societal interest in obtaining all evidence relevant to legal actions.' The concept of evidentiary privilege then will
be discussed' 6 , with particular emphasis on the interest of the state
in protecting from disclosure the confidential communications between
psychotherapists and their patients.' 7 A discussion of the reasons for
recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege will be followed by an
examination of' the psychotherapist-patient privilege codified in
California.'"
After discussing the merits of the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
this author will demonstrate that the privilege is flexible when competing state interests are deemed sufficient to outweigh the interests
supporting the privilege.' 9 To accomplish this objective, the interests
of the state in detecting and preventing child abuse will be examined. 0
9. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 3; COSTA & NELSON, supra note 8, at 17;
see also CAL. PENAL CODE §§11165-11174 (child abuse reporting act).
10. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 13; Fraser, supra note 1, at 645; Brown &
Truitt, supra note 1, at 761, 762. Reporting statutes in most states require doctors to report
suspected abuse because doctors are most likely to come in contact with abused children. Id.
11. CAL. EvYD. CODE §1010 (definition of psychotherapist).
12. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 14.
13. See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
14. See Ferster, Statutory Summary of Physician-PatientPrivilegedCommunication Laws,
in R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER, & J. RUEiN, READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCmATRY, 161-65 (1968) (summary of privilege in 40 states).

15. Britt v.Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 857, 574 P.2d 766, 774, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695,
703 (1978) cited with approval in Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 313, 316,
187 Cal. Rptr. 4, 6 (1982). The California courts have long recognized the historically impor-

tant state interest in facilitating the ascertainment of truth in legal proceedings. Id. at 316,
187 Cal. Rptr. at 6. But see infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 32-48 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 37-48 and accompanying text. CAL. EVID. CODE §§1010-1028
(psychotherapist-patient privilege).
19. See infra notes 49-80 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
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Specific attention will be devoted to the attempt of the California
Legislature to promote the detection and prevention of child abuse
through the Child Abuse Reporting Act. 2 ' California has addressed
the child abuse reporting problem by expressly exempting evidence
of psychotherapists child abuse reports from the application of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege."
The scope of this exemption recently was limited by the California
Supreme Court in People v. Stritzinger.2 3 In Stritzinger, the court held
that a psychotherapist's testimony concerning his second report of
suspected child abuse was inadmissible despite the fact that the Child
Abuse Reporting Act exempts evidence of information reported pursuant to its provisions from the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 2
This comment will contend that the court construed the exemption
more narrowly than intended by the California Legislature. 25 After
a review of the holding in Stritzinger,6 this author will conclude that
legislative clarification is necessary to promote the intent of the
legislature to exempt evidence of any reports of child abuse from the
application of the psychotherapist-patient evidentiary privilege. 27 To
support this conclusion, the interests of the state in detecting and
preventing child abuse will be examined and weighed against the interests in support of maintaining the privacy of communications between psychotherapists and patients. In the investigation of this balancing of interests, the interests in favor of maintaining the confidentiality of psychotherapist-patient communications first will be examined.
THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT

PRIVILEGE

According to Dean Wigmore, society is entitled to every person's
evidence.2 Each member of the community must sacrifice time, effort, and personal privacy to provide testimony necessary to learn

21. CAL. PENAL CODE §§11165-11174; see infra notes 91-112 and accompanying text.
22. CAL. PENAL CODE §11171(b) (privilege is inapplicable in any court proceeding to information reported pursuant to the Child Abuse Reporting Act).
23. 34 Cal. 3d 505, 668 P.2d 738, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1983).
24. 34 Cal. 3d at 514, 668 P.2d at 744, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 437. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§11171(b).
25. See infra notes 140-56 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 122-42 and accompanying text.
27. See infra pages 36-37.
28. 8 J. W
vmoR, EVIDENCE §2192 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). "When we come to examine various claims of exemption, we start with the primary assumption that there is a general
duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving. . ."Id. See also Ferster, Confidential
and Privileged Communications, in R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER, & J. RUBIN, READINGS IN LAW
AND PSYCHIATRY

154 (1968).
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the truth in legal proceedings.2 9 The legal system, however, has
acknowledged certain situations or relationships in which community
interests outweigh the need to disclose available evidence.30 Consequently, various relationships have been granted a privileged status
in the law, which enable a party to the relationship to prevent the
disclosure of confidential communications occurring within the
relationship.'
Privileges commonly are justified as promoting particular social
goals, the importance of which supports the exclusion of even the
most relevant evidence.3 2 Dean Wigmore established four conditions
that a communication must meet to merit a privileged status:3 3 (1)
the communication must originate in confidence; (2) confidentiality
must be essential to satisfactory maintenance of the parties' relationship; (3) the community must consider the relationship a proper one
to foster; and (4) the injury to the relationship that would result from
disclosure of the communication must outweigh the benefits of
disclosure for the purposes of litigation.3 4 Communications within the
psychotherapist-patient relationship have been found to fulfill these
requirements.3 5
The Evidentiary Privilege

A.

The California Legislature and judiciary have recognized the growing importance of the psychiatric profession in our modern, complex
society.3 6 Rapid economic and social changes produce extreme
tensions. 7 The psychiatric profession is essential to the preservation
of societal health and well-being since psychotherapy offers the poten29.

J. WI OmoRE,
supra note 28.
30. Note, Defendant v. Witness: Measuring Confrontation and Compulsory Process Rights
Against Statutory Communications Privileges, 30 STN. L. REV. 935, 939 (1978); see J. WimMoRE,
supra note 30, §2196. Aside from privileges, other existing evidentiary rules operate against
the interests in obtaining the truth in legal proceedings. Note, The Limits of Constitutional
Privacy in the Psychotherapist-PatientEvidentiary Privilege-Analysis of the Patient-Litigant

Exception, 8 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 55, 61 (1977). See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914) (application of the "Exclusionary Rule" in criminal cases); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961) (application of the "Exclusionary Rule" in criminal cases).

31.

See, e.g., CAL. Evw. CODE §§950- 962 (attorney-client privilege), 1030-1034 (clergyman-

penitent privilege), 990-1007 (physician-patient privilege), 980-87 (marital privilege), 1010-1028
(psychotherapist-patient privilege).
32. Note, Defendant v. Witness, supra note 30, at 940, C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF
Tm LAw OF EVrDENCE, §87, at 176 (2d ed. 1972).
33. J. WiGmoRE, supra note 28, §2285.
34. Id.
35. Slovenko, Psychiatry and A Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REv.
175, 184-93 (1960).
36. In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 421, 467 P.2d 557, 560, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 832 (1970).
37. Id. at 421, 467 P.2d at 560, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
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tial for relief of these tensions."' Confidentiality is vitally important
to the successful operation of psychotherapy.3 9 The existence of a
broad, protective psychotherapist-patient privilege evidences that
California concurs in this view."0
California Evidence Code section 1014 provides that a patient 1 has
a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent others from disclosing, confidential communications4 2 between the patient and a
pyschotherapist. 3 The code sets forth in detail the nature of the communications that are to be privileged:
[I]nformation, including information obtained by an examination of
the patient, transmitted between a patient and the psychotherapist
in the course of the relationship and in confidence by a means which,
so far as the patient is aware, discloses the information to no third
persons other than those who are present to further the interest of
the patient in the consultation, or those to whom disclosure is
of the purpose for
reasonably necessary for the ... accomplishment
44
which [the] psychotherapist is consulted.

If the patient, or someone else authorized or required to do so, claims
this privilege, the patient's psychotherapist is obligated to remain
silent.45
The Legislature enacted the psychotherapist-patient privilege to en-

courage the effective treatment of mental illness and to protect the
right of patients to privacy.4 6 The courts, however, have held that

this privilege is not absolute.47 The privilege sometimes must yield
to sufficiently compelling societal interests.

8

38. Id. at 421-22, 467 P.2d at 560, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
39. T. GTmIuEn & P. APPELBAUi, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW,
11 (1982) (essence of treatment rests on assumption of inviolate confidentiality); Ferster, Confidential and Privileged Communications, supra note 28, at 160; Slovenko, supra note 35, at
187-88.

40. See CAL. EviD. CODE §§1010-1028 (psychotherapist-patient privilege). It has been
recognized that the privacy of communications between a patient and a psychotherapist has
federal constitutional protection. Smith v. Superior Court, 118 Cal. App. 3d 136, 140, 173
Cal. Rptr. 145, 147 (1981); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 431-32, 467 P.2d 557, 567-68, 85
Cal. Rptr. 829, 839-40 (1970). The California Constitution also gives general protection to the
right of privacy. CAL. CONST. art.1 §1 (people have inalienable rights, among which is the
right to pursue and obtain privacy).
41. CAL. EvwD. CODE §1011 (definition of patient).
42. Id. §1012 (definition of confidential communication).
43. Id. §§1014 (privilege); 1010 (definition of psychotherapist).
44. Id. §1012.
45. Id. §§1014, 1015.
46. Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d at 432, 467 P.2d at 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 829; Tarasoff v. Regents
of University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 440, 551 P.2d 334, 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 26 (1976).

47. Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 848-49, 574 P.2d 766, 768, 143 Cal. Rptr.
695, 697 (1978); Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F2d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 1976); Lifschutz, 2
Cal. 3d at 432, 467 P.2d at 573, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
48. Britt, 20 Cal.3d at 848-49, 574 P.2d at 768, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 697; Caesar, 542 F.2d
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B.

Limits on the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege

In In re Lifschutz,49 the California Supreme Court was asked to
determine whether the psychotherapist-patient privilege may yield to
important state interests.5" In Lifschutz, a psychiatrist was placed in
custody for refusing to obey a discovery order issued by the trial judge
pursuant to California Evidence Code section 1016.1 California
Evidence Code section 1016 contains the "patient-litigant exception"

to the privilege. This section applies when, and to the extent that,
the patient's emotional condition
has been tendered by the patient
52
litigation.
the
in
issue
an
as
The psychiatrist in Lifschutz argued that the communications between himself and his patient were absolutely privileged.53 The court,
although acknowledging that most persons seeking psychotherapeutic
treatment harbor justifiable expectations of confidentiality,5" determined that not all "state interference" with this confidentiality is
prohibited.5 5 Lifschutz decided that the patient-litigant exception to the

psychotherapist-patient privilege was justifiable in view of the substantial state interest in facilitating the ascertainment of truth in legal
proceedings.56 The court determined, however, that an exception could

be justified only so long as it 5is7 tailored carefully and narrowly to
serve important state interests.
In a more recent Ninth Circuit decision, Caesar v. Mountanos,58
the court affirmed the Lifschutz conclusion that the psychotherapistpatient privilege is not absolute.59 As in Lifschutz, the court found
that the patient had triggered an exception" to the privilege by tenderat 1068; Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d at 432, 467 P.2d at 573, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 840. California has
made other statutory exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. See CAL. EVID. CODE,
§§1016 (patient-litigant exception), 1018 (crime or tort), 1025 (proceedings to establish competency), 1027 (child patient under 16 years of age and the victim of a crime).
49. Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
50. Lifschutz was a suit for damages resulting from an alleged assault. During the course
of a deposition, the plaintiff stated that he had received treatment from a psychiatrist approximately 10 years earlier. The psychiatrist, asserting the psychotherapist-patient privilege, refused
to answer questions relating to his communications with the former patient. Id. at 420, 467
P.2d at 560, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
51. Id. at 420-21, 467 P.2d at 560, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32.
52. Id.
53. Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d at 423, 467 P.2d at 561, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
54. Id. at 431, 467 P.2d at 567, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
55. Id. at 432, 467 P.2d at 567, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
56. Id. at 432, 467 P.2d at 568, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
57. Id. at 434-35, 467 P.2d at 570, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 842-43.
58. 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976).
59. Id. at 1068.
60. CAL. Evm. CODE §1016 (patient-litigant exception).
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ing her emotional condition as an issue in the case. 6 ' The psychiatrist,
however, refused to answer questions about the patient's condition,
and argued that the exception was not supported by compelling state
interests. 62 The Caesar court disagreed, holding that the state has a
compelling interest in ensuring that the truth is ascertained in legal
proceedings, and that this interest supports the narrowly tailored exception at issue.6 3 Thus, the psychotherapist-patient privilege was required to yield to important state interests."

The conclusion that the patient's right to privacy may yield in furtherance of compelling state interests has been reiterated by other recent California cases. In Britt v. Superior Court,6 5 the defendant sought

to inquire, through a barrage of interrogatories, into the plaintiffs'
medical history.6 6 The noise, vibrations, air pollution, and smoke

associated with defendant's operation of an airfield as a facility for
jet aircraft allegedly had caused numerous physical and mental in-

juries to the plaintiffs who were owners and residents of nearby
homes.6 The defendant sought a complete account of the plaintiffs'
medical histories including all illnesses and mental disturbances. 6 The
California Supreme Court determined that although a limited intrusion into the plaintiffs' privacy might be permissible, the defendant's
requests were overly broad. 69 The court conceded, however, that the
defendant could reframe his requests so as not to impinge improper-

ly on the plaintiffs' privacy, thus demonstrating that disclosure was
permissible under some circumstances."

Another case holding that a patient's right to privacy may yield
61. 542 F.2d at 1066-68.
62. Id. at 1069.
63. Id.
64. The court followed the rationale of the United States Supreme Court in two postLifschutz decisions: Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
As in Lifschutz, the privilege was determined to be a qualified right that could be infringed
upon a showing of compelling state interests. 542 F.2d at 1067-68.
65. 20 Cal. 3d 844, 574 P.2d 766, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695 (1978).
66. Id. at 850, 574 P.2d at 769, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
67. Id. at 849, 574 P.2d at 769, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
68. Id. at 850, 574 P.2d at 769, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
69. Id. at 864, 574 P.2d at 779, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
70. Id. at 862 n.7, 575 P.2d 778 n.7, 143 Cal. Rptr. 707 n.7. The California Court of
Appeal was faced with a similar situation under the physician-patient privilege in Board of
Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini 93 Cal. App. 3d 669, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1979). In
Gherardini, the plaintiff sought medical records from the defendant hospital and its records
custodian, Gherardini. Id. at 673, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 57. The records were sought by the plaintiff, a state agency, to substantiate allegations of incompetency against a particular doctor.
Id. at 673, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 57. The court reiterated the standard for justifying intrusion
into individual privacy, that intrusion must be excused by compelling state interests. Id. at
680, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 61. The court determined that the interests of the state in maintaining
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in furtherance of compelling state interests is Jones v. Superior Court."
The California Court of Appeal, in Jones, followed the Lifschutz rationale and agreed that privacy interests must be weighed against the

legitimate interests of the real parties in the litigation." In Jones, the
plaintiff claimed injury as a result of her mother's ingestion of the
drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) while the plaintiff was in utero."1 The
defendant sought information concerning the medical history of the
plaintiff's mother." As in Lifschutz and Caesar, the patient had
disclosed a significant portion of the protected information which triggered an exception to the privilege. 7 The court held that the privilege
76
was inapplicable to those issues previously disclosed by the patient.
All other information, however, remained within the protection of
the privilege."

As is apparent from each of these California decisions, the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is recognized to be conditional, and
may be outweighed in certain situations by compelling state interests
if the intrusion is tailored narrowly to further the specific interests
of the state.78 A particular statutory exception to the privilege that
represents strong state interests can be found in the Child Abuse
Reporting Act 7" of California.
CHILD ABUSE REPORTING

Child abuse is recognized as one of the most serious social problems in this country. 0 A 1982 study of abused children estimated that
up to fourteen percent of all children in the country were being
abused." The likelihood that this is a conservative estimate was
quality medical care were important public concerns, but disallowed disclosure because the plaintiff's inquiries were overly broad, seeking to expose the medical histories of patients with no
showing that these records were material to the investigation. Id. at 681, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
71. 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1981).
72. Id. at 550, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 157-58.
73. Id. at 540, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
74. Id. at 550, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 157-58.
75. Id. at 551, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 158. In Lifschutz, the patient had triggered the "patientlitigant" exception. See CAL. Evm. CODE §1016, and supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
76. Id. at 551, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
77. Id. at 551, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
78. See McKirdy v. Superior Court, 138 Cal. App. 3d 12, 19, 188 Cal. Rptr. 143, 148
(1982) (recognition of the concept that the privilege is conditional and may give way to compelling state interests).
79. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§11165- 11174.
80. See generally, Gil, supra note 4, 19-39 (demographics); Toro, Developmental Effects
of Child Abuse: A Review, in 6 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 423, 423-31 (1982); Straus, Stress

and Physical Child Abuse, 4 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, 75, 75-88 (1980); Fleshback, The
Effects of Violence in Childhood, 2 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY, 28 (1973).
81. Toro, supra note 80, at 424. See D. GnL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN: PHYSICAL CHILD
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conceded. s2 Significant underreporting of instances of child abuse is
one of the most troubling aspects of this problem. 3 For a number
of reasons, cases of abuse seldom are reported. One reason frequently
cited in that the victims generally are too young to report the incidents themselves.8 " Underreporting also occurs because usually only
the immediate family witnesses the abuse.8 5 To prevent further child

abuse, suspected abuse must be brought to the attention of the
authorities as soon as possible.8 6 Inflicted injuries often are serious
and generally occur in repeating patterns of abuse.87 Thus, children
are considered to be in danger while they remain in the custody of
their abusers.8 8
In 1963, California became the first state to enact legislation requiring specified persons to report suspected child abuse. 9 Several
amendments strengthened and broadened the law, 90 evidencing the enduring interest of the legislature in curbing the incidence of child
abuse. 9 Most of these amendments expanded the list of persons required to report suspected abuse. 92
In 1980, California repealed the existing law on child abuse and
enacted the Child Abuse Reporting Act9 3 (hereinafter referred to as

THE U.S. (1970); STRAus, supra note 80 (an analysis of the breadth of child abuse).
In 1977, there were approximately 70,000 cases of child abuse reported in California alone.
Press Release, California Senator Omer L. Rains, April 25, 1979, at 1 (copy on file at PaciJic
Law Review).
82. Toro, supra note 80, at 424; see also Starr, Child Abuse 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGY 872-78
(1979) (likelihood that all estimates of the incidence of child abuse are conservative).
83. Starr, supra note 82, at 872-78; Toro, supra note 80, at 424.
84. Comment, supra note 4, at 1807; Fraser, supra note 1, at 679.
85. Comment, supra note 4, at 1807; Fraser, supra note 1, at 679.
86. Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 412 n.9, 551 P.2d 389, 395 11.9, 131 Cal. Rptr.
69, 75 n.9 (1976) (citing Kempe, supra note 8, and Boardman, A Project to Rescue Children
from Inflicted Injuries, 7 Soc. voRK 43, 49 (1962)).
87. Landeros, 17 Cal. 3d at 412, 551 P.2d at 395, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 75; see also Brown
& Truitt, supra note 1 at 755.
88. Landeros, 17 Cal. 3d at 412, 551 P.2d at 395, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
89. 1963 Cal. Stat. c. 576, §1, at 1453 (enacting the reporting act); see Harper, supra
note 1 at 900.
90. See 58 Ops. CAL. ATT'y GEN. 824, 826 (1975). "Through several amendments, section
11161.5 has envolved into a comprehensive reporting statute aimed at increasing the number
and types of child abuse cases reported. In seeking this objective, the Legislature has greatly
increased and diversified the groups of persons upon whom a duty rests to report. . . . It
has also added to the types of harm which should be reported, provided alternatives to reporting to police, and immunized the reporting persons from [potential] civil or criminal liability
resulting from [making a report]." Id.
91. Id. See 1982 Cal. Stat. c. 1398, §1, at 1134 (Legislature asserts that children are a
precious resource, and recognizes that abused children are prone to commit crimes as adults).
92. See 1979 Cal. Stat. c. 373, §251, at 1357 (persons required to report suspected abuse
included dentists, doctors, nurses, teachers, chiropractors, and school principals).
93. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165-11174; see also Review of Selected 1980 CaliforniaLegislation, 12 PAC. L.J. 475 (1981).
ABUSE iN
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the Act). The Legislature asserted that the intent of the Act was to

clarify the duties and responsibilities of persons required to report
child abuse. 94 Moreover, the Legislature encouraged county welfare
or probation departments to act promptly in assessing each report
of abuse to determine (1) the composition of the household; (2) whether
reason exists to believe that any child is being abused, and if so, the
person responsible; (3) the risk to each child entailed by remaining
in the existing environment; and (4) the action that appears necessary
to help prevent further abuse. 9

Specifically, the Act requires specified professionals, 96 including
psychotherapists, 97 to report" known or suspected instances of child
abuse9 9 if they have, in their professional capacities or within the scope

of their employments, at least a reasonable suspicion that a child has
been physically abused."0 The reports must be made as soon as possible
by telephone, and must be followed by written reports.'0° Furthermore, the Act provides that these professionals may report suspected
or known abuse when they know or reasonably suspect that a child's
emotional well-being is endangered in any way.' 0 All unspecified or
lay persons may report when they have knowledge of a child who

they reasonably suspect has been abused.' 03 By providing for optional
reporting, the Act represents a departure from prior law wherein all
reports were requiredto be made.'10 Individuals who report child abuse
are granted immunity by the Act from any potential civil or criminal
liability.' 0 Moreover, the Act removes all information reported pur94. See 1980 Cal. Stat. c. 1071 §5, at 3425.
95. Id..
96. The Act requires "any child care custodian, medical practitioner, nonmedical practitioner, or employee of a child protective agency" to report known or suspected abuse. CAL.
PENAL CODE §11166(a).
97. The Act requires medical practioners to report suspected abuse. Id. "Medical practioner" is defined to include psychologists. Id. §11165(i). The definition of "psychologists"
includes "psychotherapists". CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2902(c).
98. Reports are to be made to child protective agencies. CAL. PENAL CODE §11166(a). See
Id. §11165(k) (definition of child protective agency).
99. Child abuse includes any injury inflicted by other than accidental means on a child
under the age of eighteen. CAL. PENAL CODE §11165(a)(g). Child abuse may take the forms
of sexual assault, neglect, willful cruelty, unjustifiable punishment, corporal punishment or injury, or abuse in out-of-home care. Id. § 11165(b)-(f).
100. CA. PENAL CODE §11166(a) (mandatory reporting provision). Failure to make required
reports constitutes a misdemeanor. Id. §11172(b).
101. Id. §11166(a). Written reports must be sent within 36 hours after receiving the information concerning the abuse. Id.
102. Id. §11166(b) (optional reporting); 65 Os. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 335, 336 (1982).
103. CA. PENAL CODE §11166(c) (optional reports); 65 Ops. CAL. Arr'v GEN. 335, 336 (1982).
104. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §11166(a)-(c), with 1979 Cal. Stat. c. 373, §251, at 1357
(amending CAL. PENAL CODE §11161.5).
105. CA. PENAL CODE §11172(a).
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suant to its provisions from the application of the physician-patient
privilege and the psychotherapist-patient privilege.'",
By augmenting the methods in which reports of child abuse may
be received, the California Legislature has broadened the child abuse
reporting law. The Act not only requires certain individuals to report
physical abuse, but provides that they may report suspected emotional
abuse.' 0 7 This allows a psychotherapist to report abuse even when
he is not required to do so.'"' Additionally, the Legislature has removed
all doubt about the importance of reporting child abuse by asserting
that reports made to carry out its intentions are exempted from the
application of certain evidentiary privileges.' 9 These changes evidence
a strong state interest in detecting and preventing child abuse. What
now must be determined is the extent to which confidential communications may be disclosed to achieve the purposes of the Act.
MESHING OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE WITH THE
CHILD ABUSE REPORTING ACT

The California Evidence Code provides that a patient has a privilege
to maintain the privacy of confidential communications between the
patient and a psychotherapist." Confidential communications between
a psychotherapist and a patient are protected to encourage those who
may pose a threat to themselves or others, because of some emotional or mental disturbance, to seek professional assistance."' For
psychotherapy to be productive, an atmosphere of confidentiality is
essential." 2 A patient would be disinclined to disclose details of his
personal life without assurance that those details would remain
private. III
Notwithstanding the importance of privileges, the judicial system
has recognized that the existence of a privilege may not bar evidence
of confidential communications in all situations."' In these situations,
compelling state interests in favor of disclosure may outweigh the
privacy interests of the patient. ' 5 When the state seeks to justify
106.
107.

Id. §11171(b).
Id. §11166(a),(b),(c).

108.

Id. §11166(b).

109. Id. §11171(b).
110. CAL. Evm. CODE §1014. see supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
111. Grosslight v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 3d 502, 507-8, 140 Cal. Rptr. 278, 281
(1977); Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d at 421-22, 467 P.2d at 560, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
112. Grossight, 72 Cal. App. 3d at 507-08, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
113. Id. at 507, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
114. See supra notes 47-79 and accompanying text.
115. See Id.
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disclosure of a patient's confidential communications, the interests
of the state in favor of the disclosure must be evaluated and balanced
against the patient's interest in privacy." 6 As stated by the Legislature
in the Act, the interests of the state in favor of disclosing confidential communications are the interests in detecting and preventing the
crime of child abuse.' 17 The Legislature determined that these interests,
in addition to the interest of the state in gathering all relevant facts
in legal proceedings, are sufficient to outweigh the interests in keeping evidence of confidential communications between patients and
psychotherapists privileged from disclosure." 8 The Act removes all
doubt of this by expressly exempting from the application of the
privilege evidence of information reported pursuant to the Act." 9 The
extent to which evidence of reports of child abuse may be excluded
from the privilege, however, has been narrowly defined by the California Supreme Court in a recent decision. 2 This comment will examine
that California Supreme Court decision, and establish that the opinion does not give full effect to the legislative intent of the Act.'
A.

People v. Stritzinger

22
In 1983, the California Supreme Court, in People v. Stritzinger,
was confronted with a conflict between the Child Abuse Reporting
Act and the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The defendant contended, inter alia, that his psychotherapist-patient privilege had been
violated by certain evidentiary rulings made by the trial court, which
admitted evidence of his psychotherapist's report.' 23 The court examined the exception to the privilege provided by the Act, and accepting defendant's arguments,
held that the doctor's testimony should
24
excluded.'
been
have
The defendant, Stritzinger, was accused of engaging in various sex
acts with his minor stepdaughter, Sarah, during a fifteen-month period

116. See id. As previously noted, the patient's right to privacy is protected by article 1,
section 1 of the California Constitution. This provision, however, does not prohibit all invasions of a person's privacy, but rather requires that all invasions be justified by compelling
state interests. 65 Ops. CAL. A-r'Y GEN. 335, 344 (1982). The right to privacy was initially
given federal constitutional recognition in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
117. See 1980 Cal. Stat. c. 1071, §5, at 3425 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §§11165-11174).
118.
511-12,
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

These interests are considered "compelling". People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505,
668 P.2d 738, 742-43, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431, 435-36 (1983).
CAL. PENAL CODE §11171(b).
Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 668 P.2d 738, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1983).
See infra notes 122-60 and accompanying text.
34 Cal. 3d 505, 668 P.2d 738, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431.
Id. at 510, 668 P.2d at 742, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
Id. at 513, 514, 668 P.2d at 743, 744, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 436-38.
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ending in May 1981.125 When defendant's wife, Sarah's mother, heard
of these occurrences from Sarah, she arranged for Sarah and Stritzinger to see a licensed clinical psychologist, Dr. Walker. During her
visit on July 28, 1981, Sarah declared that she had engaged in sexual
activities with her stepfather.' 2 6 That same afternoon, Dr. Walker
reported what Sarah had told him to a child welfare agency, as he
was required to do by the Act.' 27 The child welfare agency relayed
this report to the sheriff's office. On the following day, July 29, a
sheriff's deputy telephoned Dr. Walker to investigate the report. 2 8
The doctor recounted the matter and informed the deputy that he
was scheduled to counsel the defendant in a subsequent session.' 2 9
During Dr. Walker's session with Stritzinger on July 29, Stritzinger
confirmed Sarah's allegations. The investigating officer telephoned Dr.
Walker the following day to inquire further about the case of child
abuse alleged by Sarah. The officer read the exception to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege expressed in the Act 3 ' because the
doctor was reluctant to disclose the defendant's confidential
statements.'
Dr. Walker then corroborated his earlier report by
relating the substance of his discussion with Stritzinger. 3 2 The doctor was allowed to testify at trial to the substance of these
communications.
In response, the defendant moved to exclude Dr. Walker's testimony
on the basis of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.' The trial court
admitted the evidence, however, holding that the Act provided an
applicable exception to the privilege.' 34 On appeal, Stritzinger reiterated
the argument that Dr. Walker's testimony should have been excluded
at trial because of the psychotherapist-patient privilege."' Stritzinger
125. Id. at 509, 668 P.2d at 741, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 434. Sarah turned 14 on July 13, 1980.
Id. at 509 n.1, 668 P.2d 741 n.1, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 434 n.1.
126. Id. at 509, 668 P.2d at 741, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
127. Id. at 509, 668 P.2d at 741, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 434; CAL. PENAL CODE §11166(a) (mandatory reporting provision). The privilege was inapplicable to Sarah's confidential communications because the California Evidence Code removes the privilege when, as here, the patient
is less than 16 years old and the doctor has reason to believe that the patient has been the
victim of a crime and that disclosure of the communication is in the best interests of the child
CAL. Evm. CODE §1027.
128. 34 Cal. 3d at 510, 668 P.2d at 741, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
129. Id. at 510, 668 P.2d at 741, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
130. CAL. PENAL CODE §11171(b).
131. 34 Cal. 3d at 509, 668 P.2d at 741, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 434. The officer read, substantially verbatim, California Penal Code Section 11171(b) (exclusion of child abuse reports from
the psychotherapist-patient privilege).
132. 34 Ca. 3d at 509, 668 P.2d at 741, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
133. Id. at 510, 668 P.2d at 741, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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contended that on the facts of his case, the exception to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege provided by the Act was
inapplicable. 16
Specifically, the Stritzinger court held that Dr. Walker's report of
his session with Sarah was admissible under a statutory exception to
the privilege.I37 The majority reasoned that by making his initial report,
the doctor had "satisfied his statutory reporting obligation" and was
not required to make subsequent reports of the same abuse., 3" The
court held that evidence of the doctor's second report was not exempted from the privilege because he was under no duty to make
the report.' 39
The Stritzinger court acknowledged that the interests of the state
in deterring, detecting, and preventing the crime of child abuse were
compelling."I The court construed the exception to the psychotherapistpatient privilege narrowly, however, and interpreted the Act as a
legislative declaration that only evidence of required reports of abuse
was to take precedence over the privilege.' 41 By so doing, the court
effectively limited the privilege exemption expressed in the Act to
obligatory reports, and apparently, excluded from the exemption
evidence of any reports authorized, but not required, by the Act.' 42
The dissenting opinion by Justice Richardson in Stritzinger contended that Dr. Walker's report of the defendant's communications
fell within the exception found in the Act, and consequently, evidence
of that report should have been admitted.' 43 Justice Richardson argued
that the doctor's report was at least permitted by the Act, if not
required.' 44 Moreover, Justice Richardson believed that the Legislature
intended to exempt any report of child abuse from the privilege."'
Absent an applicable exception, the defendant's conversations with
the doctor were privileged from disclosure by the psychotherapist136.

Id. at 512, 668 P.2d at 743, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 436.

137.

The court held that this report fell within the exception of the psychotherapist-patient

privilege for "minor patients believed to be the victim of a crime." Id. at 513, 668 P.2d at
743-44, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 436-37. See CAL. EvID. CODE §1027.
138. 34 Cal. 3d at 514, 668 P.2d at 744, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 437. The court did, however,
state that the doctor would have been required to report had he learned of child abuse in
addition to or different than that he previously had reported. Id. at 514, 668 P.2d at 744,
194 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
139. Id. at 513-14, 668 P.2d at 744, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 437. See CAL. PENAL CODE §11171(b)
(psychotherapist-patient privilege).
140. 34 Cal. 3d at 511-12, 668 P.2d at 743, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 436.
141. Id. at 513-14, 668 P.2d at 744, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 526-27, 668 P.2d at 753, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
144. Id. at 527, 668 P.2D at 753, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 446.
145. Id.

1984 / Psychiatric Testimony

patient privilege.'

If the Legislature intended the exception in the

Act to apply to evidence of reports such as the one made by the
doctor, intrusion into the defendant's privacy was justified. As has

been shown, the interests of the state in this situation are compelling.'47
As will be reasoned, the Legislature intended evidence of all legitimate

reports of child abuse to be exempted from the privilege. This comment contends that the majority of the Stritzinger court interpreted
the exemption in the Act more narrowly than the Legislature intended,

and that the Legislature must respond with clarifying legislation. Furthermore, the Act is a penal law intended to provide a specific excep-

tion to the psychotherapist-patient privilege so that incidents of child
abuse can be investigated properly, and so that the perpetrators can

be prosecuted. The narrow ruling of the court makes successful prosecution virtually impossible in situations similar to Stritzinger by barring from evidence the admissions of the perpetrator.'
B.

The Effects of Stritzinger

Without equivocation, the Act provides that the psychotherapistpatient privilege is inapplicable to information reported pursuant to
the Act.'

9

Thus, a court finding information to have been reported

pursuant to the Act would be obliged to admit evidence thereof despite
its confidential character.

51

In the context of the Stritzinger case, Dr.

Walker's supplemental report of his meeting with Stritzinger was made
according to the provisions of the Act.' 5' As a result, the report was

not privileged, and the doctor should have been allowed to testify
about its contents." 2 As has been shown, the Act contains both man146.
CAL. Evm. CODE §1014 (privilege).
147. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
148. In Stritzinger, the evidence given by the doctor relating the victim's allegations could
not have been used to convict the defendant because of its hearsay nature. See CAL. Evm.
CODE §1200 (hearsay rule). Contrast the evidence given by the doctor relating the defendant's
admissions, which would survive a hearsay objection by fitting within the exception for admissions by a party to the action. See id. §1220 (admissions exception to the hearsay rule).
149. CAL. PENAL CODE §11171(b).
150. Courts are bound to give effect to the ordinary meaning of words in a statute "unless
otherwise clearly indicated." Alpha Beta Acme Mkts., Inc. v. City of Whittier, 262 Cal. App.
2d 16, 21, 68 Cal. Rptr. 327, 331 (1968); Lundak v. Bd. of Retirement, 142 Cal. App. 3d
1040, 1048, 191 Cal. Rptr. 446, 451 (1983); Sinnamon v. McKay, 142 Cal. App. 3d 847, 850-51,
191 Cal. Rptr. 295, 297 (1983).
151. A report made "pursuant to" the provisions of the Act is one made "according to",
or "to carry out", the provisions of the Act. See WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DicTIONARY

1848 (1976).

152. "The court must adopt the interpretation of the statute that will carry out the apparent purpose of the statute." State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 88
Cal. App. 3d 43, 53, 152 Cal. Rptr. 153, 160 (1979); McKee v. Commission on Professional
Competence, 114 Cal. App. 3d 718, 724, 171 Cal. Rptr. 81, 84 (1981).
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datory and optional reporting sections. 5 3 Dr. Walker's report could
have been classified properly within either of these sections of the Act.
The doctor's report concerning his session with the defendant
reasonably could have been classified within the permissive reporting
section of the Act'54 which allows a report when the medical practitioner knows or suspects that a child's emotional well-being is endangered in any way.155 Dr. Walker reasonably could have believed
that Stritzinger's actions toward Sarah were endangering her emotional well-being. 156 Thus, the doctor could have reported his suspicions under the optional reporting section of the Act, even though
he previously had satisfied his statutory obligation to report. The Stritzinger court, however, did not explore Dr. Walker's beliefs, which
rendered moot the optional reporting section as a basis for finding
that the doctor's report was made pursuant to the Act. The doctor's
report, after his session with Stritzinger, also could have been considered to be required by the statute. If the report was required,
evidence of the doctor's report should have been admissible even within
the narrow construction given the Act by the court.
The record of the Stritzinger case shows that Sarah's mother sent
Sarah and Stritzinger to Dr. Walker for the purpose of ascertaining
the truth of Sarah's assertions regarding sexual encounters on different occasions involving Sarah and Stritzinger, a neighbor boy, and
a shepherd. 5 7 Dr. Walker's testimony about his communications with
the defendant was crucial to corroborate what otherwise might be
considered products of the imagination of a young child.' 8 A corroborative report, such as this one, is especially important on the Stritzinger facts where physical evidence of the abuse involved in
unavailable, and the victim's allegations cannot be substantiated
without the therapist's testimony concerning the defendant's confidential statements.
153.

One of the sections is a mandatory reporting provision, the others are permissive pro-

visions. CAL. PENAL CODE §11166(a), (b), (c). See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
154. CAL. PENAL CODE §11166(b).
155.
156.

Id.
The psychological damage done to abused children may be more serious than any physical
harm. Littner, What is Known About Child Abusers, in CHILD ABUSE: PRESENT AND FUTURE
73 (1975); Fraser, supra note 1, at 655; MacFarlane, THE MENTAL HEALTH OF THE CILDPROJECT REPORTS, CHILDHOOD INFLUENCES UPON INTELLIGENCE, PERSONALITY, AND MENTAL
HEALTH, NATIONAL INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH 131 (1971). There is substantial evidence that

a child's emotional damage can be crippling and permanent. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf
of Endangered Children - A Proposed Legal Response, 6 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 3, 13
(1982 Kempe, ed.).
157. 34 Cal. 3d at 520, 668 P.2d at 749, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
158. Justice Richardson recognized this fact in his dissent. Id. at 527, 668 P.2d at 754,
194 Cal. Rptr. at 447.
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In factual situations similar to the Stritzinger case, in which the

abused child was unavailable to testify against the abuser, evidence
given by a doctor of the defendant's admissions may be the only ad-

missible evidence of guilt. Evidence of the defendant's admissions are
admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule for admissions by

a party to the action, whereas evidence of the victim's allegations
fits no such exception, and would therefore be inadmissible.' 9
The express terms of the exception to the psychotherapist-patient

privilege fully express the intent of the Legislature. Since the Act not
only requires certain persons to report, but states that they may report,

the Legislature seemingly could not have worded the exemption any
more clearly than to say that information reported pursuant to the
Act is unaffected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege.

The Stritzinger court, however, has interpreted the exemption to
apply only to mandatory reports. 60 This holding indicates that clarification is warranted to further the interests of the state in protecting
children from abuse and in prosecuting the abusers. This clarifica-

tion is essential in light of the importance of detecting and preventing child abuse.

A LEGISLATrvE PROPOSAL
Based on the above analysis, the proposed legislative clarification

is necessary for the exemption in the Act to have the broad effect
intended. Evidence of all reports authorized by the Act must be beyond

the application of the privilege. When providing that certain individuals, including psychotherapists, may report suspected abuse, the
Legislature must also have intended that evidence of these reports

would be exempted from the privilege. The Legislature must amend
the language of the exception to the privilege, to clarify the intent

that evidence of all reports of child abuse is to be excluded from
the application of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.

159. See CAL. Evm. CODE §§1200 (hearsay rule), 1220 (exception to hearsay rule for admission by a party).
160. Although the court limits the exception in the Act, the court does not affect a different exception to the privilege that could apply in certain instances. This exception renders
the privilege inapplicable if the psychotherapist has reason to believe that (1) the patient is
potentially dangerous to the person of another, and (2) disclosure of the communication is
necessary to prevent the threatened danger. See CAL. Evin. CODE §1024. If a psychotherapist
learns from the patient that the patient has abused a child, the psychotherapist could justifiably
infer that the child is in danger of future abuse because it is generally accepted that abuse
is an on-going phenomenon occurring over periods of time. See, Brown & Truitt, supra note
1, at 755; Fontana, The "Maltreatment Syndrome" in Children, 269 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1389,
1393 (1963), Landeros, 17 Cal. 3d at 412, 551 P.2d at 395, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
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To achieve the objects of the Act, the exception, section 11171(b)
of the California Penal Code, should be amended to state that evidence
of both required and optional reports is encompassed within the exception. The section then would read: "Neither the physician-patient
privilege nor the psychotherapist-patient privilege shall apply to any
information reported pursuant to the mandatory or optional reporting provisions of this article." This minor change would suffice to
give this exception the broad coverage that the reporting of child abuse
requires.
CONCLUSION

This comment has recognized the interest of the state in protecting
the confidential communications of patients and psychotherapists. The
privileged status that this relationship enjoys, however, has been shown
to be conditional rather than absolute. The interests of the state in
detecting and preventing child abuse, and in prosecuting the
perpetrators, are very important, as demonstrated by the language
of the Child Abuse Reporting Act. These interests are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the interests in keeping communications
confidential.
The Act states that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is inapplicable to reports of abuse made pursuant to the Act.' 6 ' Since the
privilege itself is a legislative creation, the Legislature has the power
to make that exclusion. The Act not only requiresspecified individuals
to report abuse, but states that they may report certain instances of
abuse. Therefore, the Act intends evidence of both types of reports
to be exempted from the privilege. This conclusion is supported by
the fact that the Legislature did not limit the exception to one type
of report or the other. 6 '
Legislative efforts in the direction of eradicating the child abuse
problem have been hampered by the narrow construction given the
exemption in the Act. This comment has demonstrated that a response
from the Legislature is warranted to clarify that the privileged status
of confidential communications between patients and psychotherapists
should not bar evidence of child abuse reports. The proposed amendment, if enacted, would accomplish this clarification.
Charles D. Cunningham, Jr.
161.
162.

CAL. PENAL CODE §11171(b).
gee CAL. PENAL CODE §11171(b).

